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A Re-evaluation of Reciprocal Dealings under the
Federal Antitrust Laws: Spartan Grain & Mill Co.
v. Ayers
INTRODUCTION
In Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers,1 the Fifth Circuit ob-
served that the market ramifications of reciprocal dealings2 and ty-
ing arrangements' are similar when considered within the context
of federal antitrust laws. As such, the court held that, within cer-
tain antitrust law proscriptions,4 the standard used to judge the
illegality of reciprocal agreements should be equivalent to that
standard used to judge the illegality of tying arrangements. More-
over, the Fifth Circuit became the first to recognize that a reci-
procity suit can be maintained as a private action by a party to the
reciprocal arrangement.5
1. 581 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979).
2. Professor Sullivan defines a reciprocal dealing arrangement as one which "involves an
undertaking by one firm to buy from another on the condition that the second also buy from
it." The author demonstrates the consummate reciprocal arrangement by the following
hypothetical:
Assume that firm A produces aluminum and that firm B manufactures machines
and parts, some of which use aluminum, and some of which are used in aluminum
production. The two firms face each other in two markets, that in which A is a
seller of aluminum and B a buyer of raw material which it will use in manufactur-
ing operations, and that in which B is a seller of machinery and parts and A a
buyer of equipment used in producing aluminum. If A were to tell B that it would
buy parts from B if B agreed to buy aluminum from it, and if B were to accept
this proposal, a classic reciprocal dealing arrangement would be [perfected].
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTImUST §170 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SULLI-
VAN]. See also United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
where the court stated: "[Sluch an arrangement provides in essence that, 'if you buy from
me, I'll buy from you,' or. . . 'you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours.'" Id. at 57.
3. See SULLIVAN, supra note 2, §15 (1977), where the author states, "A tie exists when a
seller, having a product which buyers want (the 'tying product'), refuses to sell it alone and
insists that any buyer who wants it must also purchase another product (the 'tied
product')."
4. See notes 139-141 infra and accompanying text.
5. The right of an individual to maintain a private civil action under the federal anti-
trust laws is recognized under §4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §15 (1976), which provides in
pertinent part: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent .... "
See notes 91-102 and 133-136 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the rela-
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The purpose of this article is to explore the potential usefulness
of the Spartan Grain approach as a means of adjudging the illegal-
ity of reciprocal agreements. First, this article will examine the dif-
ferent types of reciprocal dealings that have been traditionally rec-
ognized and discuss how each has been dealt with under sections
one6 and two 7 of the Sherman Act and section five of the Federal
Trade Commission Act 8 prior to the Spartan Grain decision. Next,
the article will discuss and critically analyze the Spartan Grain
case. Then it will explore the ramifications of that decision on the
analysis and disposition of future reciprocity suits under the fed-
eral antitrust laws. Finally, this article will demonstrate that the
Spartan Grain decision may, with certain qualifications, act as the
definitive precedent by which to analyze all forms of reciprocity'
which may come to be adjudicated under the appropriate federal
antitrust laws.10
tionship between the above statutory provision and reciprocal dealings.
6. 15 U.S.C. §1 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ... "
7. 15 U.S.C. §2 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Every person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to mo-
nopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... "
8. 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1) (1976) provides: "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared
unlawful."
9. The element of reciprocity has also come to play an important part in analyzing the
anticompetitive effects of conglomerate acquisitions or mergers challenged under §7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §18 (1976). In F.T.C. v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592
(1965), the seminal case addressing this issue, the Court held a conglomerate merger to be in
violation of §7 of the Clayton Act because it resulted in a market structure conducive to
reciprocal dealing by the resulting corporation.
Because essentially different issues from contractual arrangements in violation of §§ 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act and §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act are involved in analyz-
ing mergers, a discussion of reciprocity within that context is outside the scope of this arti-
cle. It suffices to say that reciprocity, when considered within such a context, refers to the
"reciprocity effects" of the merger and the tendency of firms, absent coercive or voluntary
agreements, express or implied, to buy from those to whom they sell, desire to sell, or feel
obligated to regardless of the reason. For a broader discussion of reciprocity, its effects, and
§7 of the Clayton Act, see, e.g., 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4300 (1977); SULLIVAN, supra
note 2, §209; VON KAUNOWSKI, 16 G. Business Organizations, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATIONS §63.06(1) (6th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as VoN KALINOWSKI].
10. It should be noted here that although §3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §14 (1976),
has been held to apply to certain exclusive dealings and tying arrangements, it is of no
consequence in attacking reciprocal dealings. The provision forbids sales which are made on
the condition that the purchaser will not use or deal in the goods of a competitor of the
seller. In reciprocal dealings, the condition of the arrangement is attached to purchases. The
section, therefore, is inapplicable to reciprocal dealings on jurisdictional grounds. See note
Reciprocal Dealings
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
In practice, three types of reciprocal dealings are generally rec-
ognized:" unilateral or voluntary reciprocity;"2 mutual or negoti-
ated reciprocity;' and coercive or leverage reciprocity. 4 The less-
than consistent rules and legal precedents which have been used to
analyze the validity of reciprocal dealings under the antitrust laws
may reflect the different economic impact of each of these forms of
reciprocity.' Accordingly, in evaluating the legality of reciprocal
arrangements, the nature and anticompetitive consequences of
each of these three types of arrangements must be separately
considered."6
104 intro.
11. See generally Dunne, Reciprocity: The Hazards of Backscratching, 11 WILL. L. J.
159, 169 (1975); Harvith, Reciprocity and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 40 WASH. L. REv.
133, 136 (1965); VON KALNOWSKI, supra note 9, §63.03.
12. Unilateral reciprocity is the purchasing from another to promote sales to that other
party absent any guarantee of that second party's acting. See generally Hausman, Recipro-
cal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARV. L. REv. 873, 877 (1964) (hereinafter cited as
Hausman]. This kind of reciprocity can be characterized by, "if I buy from you, I hope that
you will buy from me."
13. In a mutually reciprocal arrangement, two parties with equal bargaining power agree
to purchase each other's products or services motivated simply by the mutual benefits flow-
ing from purchasing upon that condition. See Flinn, Reciprocity and Related Topics Under
the Sherman Act, 37 ANTITmusT L. J. 156, 158 (1968). This kind of reciprocity can be ex-
pressed simply as, "if you will buy from me, I will buy from you."
14. Coercive reciprocity involves the assertion of economic force by a customer or his
suppliers for the purpose of making them buy his own products. See Asper, Reciprocity,
Purchasing Power and Competition, 48 MINN. L. REV. 523, 524 (1964). This kind of reci-
procity involves the expressed or implied threat of "if you want me to buy from you, you
had better buy from me."
15. See notes 41-77 infra and accompanying text.
16. It should be noted that other forms of reciprocity have been recognized. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 320 F.2d 509
(3d Cir. 1963), a kind of three-way or "secondary" reciprocal arrangement was considered
within a merger context. The arrangement can best be depicted by the following illustration:
Sales A Resultant
Sales
Pressure
Sales
Pressure
This and other species of reciprocal arrangements differ from those discussed in the text
only with respect to the number of parties involved and, as such, they present no unique
economic or substantive considerations. Therefore, they will not be separately addressed in
1980]
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Perhaps no single business practice addressed by the antitrust
laws has created as much controversy concerning its inherent mar-
ket logic and economic effects as has reciprocity. Although the De-
partment of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have for some
time demonstrated concern over the practice,17 academic econo-
mists have failed to reach any consensus as to the market ramifica-
tions generated by reciprocal arrangements."8 Still, even when con-
sidered in its most elementary form, reciprocity does present
certain economic disadvantages to particular market competitiors.
As such, the practice is necessarily worthy of redress under the an-
titrust laws.
The Anticompetitive Effects of Reciprocal Dealings:
The Setting
Certain market conditions. underlie the practice of reciprocity.1"
First, by definition,2 0 there must necessarily be a two-way flow of
buying and selling between two industries. Second, reciprocity is
usually related to an oligopolistic market structure because of the
fact that the practice is incompatible with the severe price compe-
this discussion. See generally Ford, Reciprocity, Advisory Procedures, and Class Actions,
UTAH L. REV. 633, 636 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ford] for an examination of "secondary"
reciprocity and other forms of reciprocal arrangements.
17. The Department of Justice considers reciprocal buying "an economically unjustified
business practice which confers a competitive advantage on the favored firm unrelated to
the merits of its product." JUSTICE DEPT. MERGER GUIDELINES $19(a) (1968). See also notes
41-64 and 70-73 infra and accompanying text for an historical examination of the treatment
of reciprocal dealings by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
18. The critics of reciprocity generally contend that the practice leads to market foreclo-
sure, increased industrial concentration, and the thwarting of the price mechanism as an
allocative guide to purchasing. See notes 27-34 infra and accompanying text. The academic
skeptics, on the other hand, have suggested'that (1) reciprocity cannot occur at all in a
competitive market, (2) even if it does occur in a competitive market, its effects are innocu-
ous, and (3) when it occurs in a non-competitive market, its effects are likely to be procom-
petitive. Compare, e.g., Blackstone, Monoposony Power, Reciprocal Buying and Govern-
ment Contracts: The General Dynamics Case, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 445 (1972); Dean,
Economic Aspects of Reciprocity, Competition, and Mergers, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 843 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Dean]; Stocking and Mueller, Business Reciprocity and the Size of
Firms, 30 J. Bus. 73 (1957) with Lorie and Halpern, Conglomerates: The Rhetoric and the
Evidence, 13 J. L. & ECON. 149 (1970); Sichel, Business Reciprocity: An Unsettled Anti-
trust Issue, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 649 (1968); and Stigler, Working Paper IV; Reciprocity, 2
ANTITRUST L. & EcON. R. 51 (1969).
19. See generally Dean, supra note 18; SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
INDUSTRIAL PERPORMANCE, 280 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SCHERER]; STOCKING, WORKABLE
COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST POLICY, 287 (1961).
20. See note 2 supra.
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tition found in freely competitive markets. 21 Specifically, oligo-
polists, in preferring non-price rivalry to price competition, will
necessarily regard the practice of reciprocity and its tendency to
militate against price competition as highly desirable. Third, sup-
pliers must possess an excess capacity which renders them suscep-
tible to filling orders on other then price mechanism grounds. For
example, the pressure to engage in reciprocal practices would be at
its'highest during periods of recession and at its lowest during
times of economic boom.2
Fourth, reciprocal practice typically assumes the presence of a
diversified multi-unit firm, engaged in various businesses, that pro-
vides goods and services to many industries.23 The mere use of
purchasing power is not usually sufficient to induce an effective re-
ciprocal dealing program. Thus, only diversified firms will possess
sufficient economic leverage" to initiate reciprocal arrangements
with suppliers .2  Finally, reciprocal dealing favors assymetry in size
on the initiating competitor level. The larger the firm, the greater
is its economic leverage in contrast with that of smaller sized pur-
chasers. Consequently, the probability of a larger, diverse firm suc-
cessfully initiating an effective reciprocal dealing program with its
suppliers is greater.2
21. See notes 27 and 28 infra and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Sloane, Reciprocity: Where Does the P.A. Stand? PURCHASING 70 (Novem-
ber 20, 1961).
23. The diversified multi-unit firm discussed is typically referred to as a conglomerate. A
conglomerate is a firm, or a group of jointly owned or controlled firms, operating in several
markets neither horizontally nor vertically related. SULLIVAN supra note 2, §207 (1977).
24. In the context of reciprocal arrangements, "economic leverage" reflects not only a
firm's qualitative ability to purchase from a certain supplier, but also its quantitative ability
to purchase a greater volume of goods more frequently than its competitors from that
supplier.
25. Effective reciprocal practices ordinarily are not perpetrated by single-unit firms. As-
suming that all competitors of a single unit firm purchase from the same suppliers, no one,
outside of a competitor wielding excessive market share power, will have any distinct advan-
tage over the others in terms of possible economic leverage. Consequently, it is unlikely that
any one will be successful in acting as the initiator of an effective reciprocal arrangement.
See Finney, Reciprocity and Public Policy, 2 ANTITRUST L. AND EcON. 97, 101 (1969), for a
comparison of attempted reciprocal dealings of multi-unit firms with those of single-unit
firms.
26. The relevance of this factor is best demonstrated by a comparison of the conglomer-
ate giant with that of its rival sellers specializing in a limited amount of product lines. See
note 25 supra and accompanying text. Two instances most notably demonstrate the advan-
tages adhering to the wielding of economic leverage by a conglomerate concern with relation
to reciprocal dealings. The first concerns that market structure where the conglomerate gi-
ant sells only one or a very few narrow segments of its product line to a supplier who in turn
is anxious to satisfy the demand input by all of the conglomerate's divisions. The second
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The Anticompetitive Effects of Reciprocal Dealings: Generally
There are three anticompetitive effects associated with the prac-
tice of reciprocity. First, when a supplier decides from whom he
will purchase his requirements within a reciprocity context, his
choice will not necessarily be based upon the merits of the product
or services.2 7 In a freely competitive market, purchases are made of
the best available goods at the lowest possible prices to ensure the
buyer maximum profits and minimum competitive risks. However,
reciprocity erodes the traditional purchasing criteria of price, qual-
ity, and service. Instead, the potential for personal economic bene-
fitS2 8 suggested by the reciprocal arrangement itself becomes the
dominant if not exclusive reason for a party's purchasing deci-
sion. 9 Further, should a supplier decide not to participate in a
proposed reciprocal dealing arrangement, he may risk a substantial
loss of that customer's business and goodwill. As a result of recip-
rocal practices, then, the offer of superior goods at lower prices will
no longer function as controlling, and price and quality allocative
efficiency will increasingly lose their market effect.
A second anticompetitive effect attributed to reciprocity is the
creation of oligopolistic and monopolistic industries inimical to the
national economy.80 As particular firms within a given market in-
crease their sales through the successful implementation of effec-
tive reciprocal dealings programs, they also increase their market
leverage to the detriment of their competitors. The market struc-
ture, thus, becomes more concentrated and the number of competi-
tors becomes fewer.31 Further, the personal advantages inherent in
deals with those business situations where the smaller firms do not, and typically cannot,
offer more attractive sales terms to the supplier than does their rival conglomerate concern.
See SCHERER, supra note 19.
27. See VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 9, §63.05(2).
28. The personal economic benefits involved would be higher profit margins for the initi-
ating seller and guaranteed purchasing markets for the supplier.
29. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965). Reciprocity "results in an
'irrelevant and alien factor' intruding into the choice among competing products, creating at
the least 'a priority on the business at equal prices.'" Id. at 594. See also Hausman, supra
note 12. But cf. SCHERER, supra note 19, at 281-282 (firm's purchases are generally awarded
even in connection with reciprocal arrangements only when the price, quality, and delivery
conditions offered by the seller are equal with that of its competitors).
30. See VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 9, §63.05(3).
31. See Blair, Reciprocity and Competition: A Problem of Conflicting 'Assumptions', 6
ANTTRusT L. & ECON. 77 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Blair, Assumptions]. Blair views the
problem as one turning on a firm's ability to diversify and on the likely maintenance of
entry barriers. An expansion of a firm's sales through reciprocity would raise the firm's own
profits even without an increase in its unit prices above the competitive level. However,
[Vol. 11
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the practice encourage businesses to expand, through merger or di-
versification, to the level of oligopolies in order that they may ac-
quire economic leverage that will allow the promotion of an effec-
tive reciprocal dealings program.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, reciprocity has been said
to foreclose from a particular market those competitors of the
seller who are without economic leverage.3 2 If the seller desires to
assure itself a significant amount of business from a particular sup-
plier, the seller may exert the economic leverage found in its
purchasing relationship with that same supplier. The supplier will
then succumb to the seller's efforts lest it risk the loss of a signifi-
cant amount of sales. One consequence of this relationship, then, is
that actual competitors of the seller who do not possess any corre-
sponding economic leverage will be denied the opportunity to en-
gage in market trading with the supplier based upon the merits of
their products.3 Further, market entry by potential competitors
will be discouraged when it is known that economic leverage,
rather than marketing quality and efficiency, will produce business
solvency.3 In the final analysis then, reciprocity tends to draw
financial rewards increasingly toward those firms capable of apply-
ing market leverage and away from those competitors unable to do
SO.
The Anticompetitive Effects of Reciprocal Dealings:
The Specific Forms
When considered separately, the market ramifications of unilat-
eral, mutual, and coercive reciprocal arrangements may or may not
be similar and, in fact, may or may not be anticompetitive. The
particular set of anticompetitive effects attributable to a reciprocal
arrangement can only be identified if the nature and substance of
that arrangement are considered.
Unilateral reciprocity serves as possibly the least malevolent
given that the industry is in relative equilibrium as to its demand curve, the profits of the
industry would remain the same. Assuming that potential entrants appraise their profit
prospects on the basis of those being earned by the least profitable firms in the industry,
lack of profit "growth" would deter entry into the market. The reduction in the number of
firms would thus make collusion more likely among the competing survivors. Further, the
entry barriers would continue to be preserved because the capacity to engage in reciprocity
depends on diversification and all firms are demonstrably not equal in this respect.
32. See VoN KALINOWSKI, supra note 9, §63.05(1).
33. See SCHERER, supra note 19.
34. See Hausman, supra note 12, at 879-880.
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trading practice of the three traditional forms of reciprocal ar-
rangements. This type of purchasing practice cannot be said to
have any adverse market structure ramifications because by defini-
tion the purchases may not be sufficiently capable of stimulating
actual reciprocity.35 Further, because unilateral reciprocity usually
occurs where there is no economic leverage, the traditional
purchasing criteria of price, quality, and service are not obstructed.
Finally, the term unilateral reciprocity is itself inherently contra-
dictory. Because there is never any actual arrangement between
the trading parties, the practice can never constitute actual reci-
procity. Thus, if the practice is to be considered anticompetitive
for purposes of antitrust law scrutiny, it can only be so where cer-
tain monopolistic ramifications are at issue.38
Consensual reciprocity is most often motivated by the prospect
of mutual benefits flowing to both parties concerned. Price and
quality mechanisms may no longer serve as allocative guides in the
market and, consequently, significant market structure ramifica-
tions may result if the arrangements represent a substantial por-
tion of trade within the relevant selling market.3 7 The problems
presented by this type of reciprocal dealing are even further com-
pounded because the practice is difficult to isolate and even harder
to substantiate.38
35. See Kintner, The Anatomy of Reciprocity, 56 A. B. A. J. 232 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Kintner]. The author reasons that reciprocity can be stimulated only if there is an
expectation of additional future purchases of significant volume. Typically, a continuous
course of dealings gives the purchaser economic leverage over the seller. When such leverage
is achieved, the purchasing patterns take on a coercive form. At that point, the purchasing
arrangements will fall into one of the two other categories of reciprocity and there is no
longer any need to examine them on a unilateral basis.
36. See notes 66-69 infra and accompanying text.
37. But see Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and Joint
Ventures, 49 VA. L. REV. 433, 437 (1963). Handler suggests that, in the absence of coercion,
"we should leave to the market place and the processes of education the elimination of
practices which may be unbusinesslike or uneconomical but are not demonstrably anticom-
petitive." See also Blair, Reciprocity in an Uncertain Environment, 21 ANTITRUST BULL.
273 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Blair, Environment]. There, the author suggests that, in a
freely competitive market, the parties to the arrangement as well as the consumer will bene-
fit because, given the existence of random demand functions, the arrangements will en-
courage a larger output by the firms.
38. See M. HANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION, 712, 713 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Handler]. However, the gravity of the problem may be to a great degree
lessened by the strong probability that mutual reciprocity is now rare. See Kintner, supra
note 35. There, the author suggests that businessmen have come to realize not only the
illegality of mutually reciprocal dealings but also the damaging effect that the practice may
have on corporate flexibility. Where neither party is at the economic mercy of the other, it
simply would be bad business to invest in a transaction devoid of the advantages of trading
[Vol. 11
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Finally, coercive reciprocity and the exercise of economic lever-
age to exact reciprocating purchases from a disadvantaged supplier
is the most predatory and anticompetitive activity of the three.
With respect to the parties to the arrangements themselves, the
seller's wielding of economic leverage serves as a threat to the sup-
plier. If the supplier refuses to engage in the reciprocal activity, it
suffers the risk of losing the seller as a customer."9 With respect to
competitors within a market tinged with coercive reciprocity, the
malevolent economic results of market foreclosure and the raising
of entry barriers to competitors of the selling firm are clearest.40
Thus, coercive reciprocity tends to benefit a single party within a
market at the expense of viable business competition within that
market.
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Legal redress for reciprocal dealings has been sporadic. Although
attacks against the practice began in the early 1930's, further pur-
suit lay dormant for approximately thirty years.41 Even when the
attacks were resumed in the mid-1960's, the cases resulted in weak
and sometimes inconsistent, legal precedent.
The Initial Trend Toward the Recognition of the
Illegality of Reciprocal Dealings
The earliest cases involving reciprocal dealings were instituted
by the Federal Trade Commission. In administrative proceedings,
the Commission attacked the "coercive" use of purchasing power
in the free marketplace.
39. But see Blair, Assumptions, supra note 31, at 80-82. The supplier would consider the
seller's threat to stop buying from it a credible one only if its own competitors were capable
of taking over its role of supplying products to the threatenting firm. Further, if the product
offered by a seller and its competitors is considered homogeneous by the supplier and if the
price is not being raised above the competitive level, the supplier will presumably be indif-
ferent as to a seller's wielding of economic leverage to effect a reciprocal dealings program.
40. But see Blair, Environment, supra note 37, at 279-84, where the effects of reciprocal
dealings are considered within the context of an imperfectly competitive market. Blair's
mathematical models suggest that when the selling firms behave as quantity setters, the
parties to the agreement as well as the consumer benefit because the arrangement will en-
courage a larger output by the firms. It is only when the selling firms behave as price setters
that higher prices along with market foreclosure and entry barriers to actual and potential
competitors will be encountered.
41. This dormancy may have resulted from the distinction drawn between coercive reci-
procity and voluntary reciprocal arrangements for mutual benefit. See Note, Business Reci-
procity: A Growing Field of Development Under the Antitrust Laws and an Important
Consideration for Businesses in Their Purchasing Arrangements, 4 Loy. CH. L. J. 446, 448-
49 (1973).
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as an unfair method of competition.2 Without any substantial con-
sideration of the market ramifications of the practice the Commis-
sion merely indicated that reciprocity unfairly diverted business
from competitors of the participants because considerations re-
garding the freely competitive market criteria of price and quality
were absent.4 s In those cases, the Commission established the gen-
eral principle that the abuse of large scale buying power to restrict
market competition is illegal.'
The first judicial suggestion of the illegality of reciprocity under
the antitrust laws was made in United States v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co. "s The strength of the court's dicta 6 in condemning the practice
of reciprocity as "particularly destructive of competition" clearly
suggested that the practice could be prohibited by the federal anti-
trust laws. However, the issue of whether the practice of reciproc-
ity, by itself, constituted an antitrust violation remained
unresolved.'7
Two years later, in F.T.C. v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,'4 the Su-
42. These actions were instituted pursuant to §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
15 U.S.C. §45 (1976). In the first two cases, In re Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931)
and In re Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932), large meat packing firms with vast
power as major railroad shippers acquired control of minor manufacturers of railroad equip-
ment. During subsequent negotiations with railroads, the firms indicated that unless the
railroads purchased equipment from the manufacturers controlled by the meat packers,
their dealings with the railroads would be severely curtailed. In the third case, In re Califor-
nia Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937), a large diversified food processing company used its
purchasing power and freight volume to require suppliers and transport companies to pa-
tronize its subsidiary terminal corporation.
43. See In re Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
44. See also United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (large scale buying may not be
used to stifle competition by denying market access to less favorably situated competitors
Id. at 108).
45. 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963). The case was brought
under §7 of the Clayton Act which prohibits acquisitions which would tend to lessen compe-
tition or create a monopoly. The suit involved the propriety of three acquisitions in light of
the probability that the acquiring corporations would be able to promote "secondary" recip-
rocal arrangements after the mergers. See note 16, supra.
46. The trial court stated:
[Wihat may here be involved is the trade practice known as 'Reciprocity' .
[In it,] [tihe competitor may thereby suffer loss because of a circumstance not
bearing directly on the worth of his product. In this situation, it is the relative size
and conglomeration of business rivals, rather than their competitive ability, that
may determine success. Obviously, this practice strikes at one of the basic prem-
ises of a free enterprise economy.
218 F. Supp. at 552.
47. See Hale & Hale, Reciprocity Under the Antitrust Laws: A Comment, 113 U. PA. L.
REV. 69 (1964).
48. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
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preme Court made its first and thus far only comment upon reci-
procity. 9 The Court in broad terms deemed the practice anticom-
petitive and worthy of redress under the federal antitrust laws. 0
The Court's general language further suggested that reciprocal
dealings, even through subtle or voluntary arrangements, 1 might
give rise to antitrust issues in contexts other than that of mergers.
Nonetheless, the Court did not indicate what those contexts might
be or what mode of analysis should be employed to determine
when or whether an antitrust violation has occurred.
Finally, one year later, United States v. General Dynamics52 ad-
dressed the issue of whether the practice of reciprocity could,
standing alone, constitute an antitrust violation under section one
of the Sherman Act.5 3 In analyzing the competitive consequences
of reciprocal dealings, the court initially determined that both co-
ercive reciprocity and mutual patronage agreements were anticom-
petitive in nature.5 4 The court then analogized the practice of re-
ciprocal dealings to that of "tying-in" arrangements. As such, the
court adopted the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court
49. This case also dealt with reciprocity in a merger context. The Federal Trade Com-
mission sought to divest a major producer of food products of a subsidiary it had acquired
which was one of the two dominant producers of dehydrated onion and garlic. The Commis-
sion held that the acquisition would present the producer with the opportunity to exercise
leverage tHrough its purchasing power against food processors who used dehydrated onion
and garlic in their products in order to increase its onion and garlic sales with them. In re
Consolidated Foods Corp., 62 F.T.C. 929 (1963), rev'd, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964). The
Court of Appeals, relying mainly on ten years of post-acquisition experience, held that no
probability of a substantial lessening of competition had been shown.
50. The Court termed reciprocity: "One of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at
which the antitrust laws are aimed.. . . A threatened withdrawal of orders if products of an
affiliate cease being bought, as well as a conditioning of future purchases on the receipt of
order for products of that affiliate, is an anticompetitive practice." 380 U.S. at 594.
51. See 380 U.S. at 594 n.2 citing Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power,
Nat. Bur. Eco. Research, Business Concentration and Price Policy, 331, 342 (1955).
52. 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
53. The government alleged that the defendant's acquisition of a leading producer of
carbon dioxide and industrial gases violated both §7 of the Clayton Act and §1 of the Sher-
man Act. As a separate allegation under §1, the government asserted that the defendant
utilized its vast purchasing power to gain sales for its acquired company.
54. 258 F. Supp. at 57-59.
55. Id. at 65-66. The court stated that in the same way a prospective vendor ties the sale
of one product to the purchase of another within a tying arrangement context, so too does a
prospective buyer "tie" its purchases from a present or prospective vendor to that vendor's
own purchases from it within a reciprocal arrangement. Thus, whether it be through a trans-
ference of selling or of purchasing power to inflate sales in other markets, a frustration of
competitive criteria in determining which firms receive which purchasing orders would be
accomplished.
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with respect to tying arrangements5 and engrafted them onto the
practice of reciprocal dealings. It was thus recognized for the first
time that contracts generated by reciprocity considerations could
in themselves violate section one of the Sherman Act.57
The court, however, refused to find a section one violation on the
facts before it.58 Its failure to set forth a clear standard of evalua-
tion59 as well as the rather inconsequential grounds upon which it
refused to find the reciprocal arrangements violative of section one
of the Sherman ActO° renders the General Dynamics case an inad-
56. The court predicated its analysis and decision primarily on three cases in which ty-
ing arrangements were evaluated under the federal antitrust laws. In International Salt Co.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), the Court held it to be "unreasonable, per se, to
foreclose competitors from any substantial market" by a tying arrangement. Id. at 396. With
qualifications, the position was rearticulated in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). Five years later, the Court, in Northern Pacific Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), defined the standard of evaluation still employed in holding that
tying arrangements "are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in
the market for the tied product and a 'not insubstantial' amount of commerce is affected."
Id. at 6.
57. 258 F. Supp. at 66.
58. Id. at 67.
59. Although asserting that its mode of analysis was to be similar to that used in evalu-
ating tying arrangements, the court did not adequately address the issues before it in terms
of the dual requirement test of "sufficient economic power" and "an effect on a not insub-
stantial" amount of interstate commerce promoted by the then most recent Northern Pa-
cific decision. See note 56 supra. Rather, the court seemed to more heavily rely on the
standard set forth by the International Salt Court in which the "sufficient economic power"
factor was not considered. This led one commentator to suggest that the General Dynamics
court established a modified per se rule. Under it, reciprocity would be illegal where a not
insubstantial amount of commerce was adversely affected. See Ford, supra note 16, 640.
If this interpretation is correct, the court's decision comes exceedingly close to holding
that any reciprocal agreement is unlawful so long as the transaction represents a significant
dollar volume. Such a standard would in effect be harsher than that used to evaluate tying
arrangements under the Northern Pacific decision. It should be noted, however, that the
court did state that "the government has proven the other prong of the Sherman §1 case,
viz., that the merger itself is violative of the statute .... " 258 F. Supp. at 67. See note 53
supra. It remains unclear, however, whether this language stands merely as dicta or whether
the finding of an illegal merger itself was intended by the court to serve as its consideration
of the "sufficient economic power" requirement of Northern Pacific.
60. The court found that the "not insubstantial amount of commerce" element had not
been met. The court noted that the $500,000 in sales of tied products held sufficient in
International Salt was "the lowest figure so designated ... to date, in situations analogous
to the present case." Id. at 67. The court determined that, insofar as only $177,225 worth of
sales was involved, the case was an "inappropriate vehicle for finding an amount considera-
bly less than $500,000 as 'not insubstantial' ", especially where the government had already
proved that the merger itself violated §1. Id. at 67.
The issue which the General Dynamics court was reluctant to address was considered by
the Supreme Court in Fortner Enterprises, Inc, v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495
(1969), where it was indicated that commerce in the amount of $190,000 was not insubstan-
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equate legal precedent with which to appropriately address and
analyze reciprocal dealings under the antitrust laws. Nonetheless,
the decision is significant because it foreshadowed the broader ba-
ses of future attacks on reciprocity.
Post-General Dynamics Developments
Less than one year after the General Dynamics decision, the De-
partment of Justice began to file a series of complaints attacking
reciprocal agreements pursuant to both sections one and two of the
Sherman Act. 61 Each complaint named only a single defendant and
each asserted that, pursuant to an alleged combination and mo-
nopoly, the defendants had engaged in similar activities.62 These
tial. Moreover, the Court stated that: "normally the controlling consideration is simply
whether a total amount of business, substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not
to be merely de minimus, is foreclosed to competitors by the tie .... " Id. at 501.
61. The facts and results of each case are reported at: United States v. Airco Inc., 386 F.
Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Grow Chem. Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
(1974-1 Trade Cas.) 97,058 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Continential Can Co., TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) (1974-1 Trade Cas.) 97,054 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1973-1 Trade Cas.) 94,508 (W.D. Pa. 1973);
United States v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1973-1 Trade Cas.)
93,587 (W.D. Mo. 1973); United States v. Crane Co., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1973-1 Trade
Cas.) 93,513 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1972
Trade Cas.) 92,422 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc., TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) (1972 Trade Cas.) 92,419 (N.D. Tex. 1972); United States v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1972 Trade Cas.) 92,358 (W.D. Pa. 1972); United States v.
H.K. Portor Co., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1972 Trade Cas.) 91,802 (W.D. Pa. 1972); United
States v. Martin Marietta Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1972 Trade Cas.) 91,596 (D. Md.
1972); United States v. Ownes-Illinois, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1972 Trade Cas.)
91,485 (N.D. Ohio 1972); United States v. Jackson's Atlanta Ready Mix Concrete Co.,
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1972 Trade Cas.) 91,483 (N.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1971 Trade Cas.) 90,431 (W.D. Pa. 1971);
United States v. Reynolds Metal Co., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1971 Trade Cas.) 90,603
(E.D. Va. 1971); United States v. National Steel Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1971 Trade
Cas.) 90,017 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Evans Prods. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
(1971 Trade Cas.) 89,851 (N.D. Ill. 1971); United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp. TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) (1971 Trade Cas.) 89,808 (D. N.Y. 1971); United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1970 Trade Cas.) 89,502 (E.D. Pa. 1970); United States v.
PPG Indus. Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1970 Trade Cas.) 89,492 (W.D. Pa. 1970); United
States v. General Tire & Rubber Co., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1970 Trade Cas.) 89,716
(N.D. Ohio 1970); United States v. Armco Steel Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (1970 Trade
Cas.) 89,111 (S.D. Ohio 1970); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) (1970 Trade Cas.) 88,960 (N.D. Ohio 1970); United States v. Inland Steel Co., TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) (1970 Trade Cas.) 88,739 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
62. The allegations of each complaint asserted that the defendant: a) complied and coor-
dinated comparative purchase and sales data and other information relating to its customers
and suppliers; b) utilized this information to determine which suppliers should be favored
and the extent to which they should be permitted to participate in supplying defendant's
requirements of goods and services; c) discussed with actual and potential suppliers and
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cases bore the potential for clarifying the rather obscure legal pre-
cedent relating to the practice of reciprocity. However, all but one
of these casesa3 resulted in consent decrees, thereby affording the
Government almost all of the injunctive relief prayed for in the
complaints." Thus, these cases are of no legal value in suggesting
the analytical framework to be employed in evaluating the prac-
tice. Nevertheless, the suits did serve to warn the business commu-
nity of the possible adverse consequences of reciprocal dealings.
In addition to those cases adjudicated on the initiative of the
Department of Justice, a limited amount of private litigation arose
subsequent to the General Dynamics decision. Most of these cases
were resolved on grounds not addressing the anticompetitive na-
ture of reciprocal dealings and they are therefore lacking in rele-
vant substantive analysis.65 However, W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc.
customers their sales and purchase positions relative to the defendant; and d) purchased
goods from certain suppliers on the understanding that such suppliers would purchase goods
and services from the defendant.
63. In United States v. Airco, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the court adopted
the rationale of General Dynamics and similarly analogized reciprocal dealings to tying ar-
rangements. However, the court found no violation of §1 of the Sherman Act because insuf-
ficient evidence was presented demonstrating that any actual reciprocal arrangements were
made. Further, the court held that the government's failure to introduce evidence defining
the relevant market and showing the defendant's intent to monopolize was fatal to its §2
charge that the defendant attempted to monopolize the requirements market of its suppliers
through the use of reciprocal dealings.
64. See Ferguson, Business Reciprocity as a Sherman Act Violation: A Generally Ac-
cepted, But as Yet Unadjudicated, Doctrine, 74 W. V. L. REv. 343, 353-55 (1972) for an
extensive discussion of the particular acts from which the court enjoined and restrained
each defendant, its employees and officers.
65. In Fidelity Television, Inc. v. F.C.C., 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
926 (1975), the court held that the Federal Communications Commission did not err when it
failed to disqualify a station for license renewal on the basis of the station's reciprocity
practices. The court stated in dicta, however, that it doubted that unilateral, unsuccessful
attempts at reciprocity constituted antitrust violations. Further, it questioned whether suc-
cessful, noncoercive attempts at reciprocity constituted antitrust violations outside of the
merger context.
In Ryals v. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 481 (D. Minn. 1975), the court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint attacking mandatory buy-back provi-
sions in purchase agreements between an automobile rental company and an automobile
dealership. The court held as matter of law that the provisions failed to qualify as an unlaw-
ful reciprocal dealing for two reasons. First, only one product was involved because of the
fact that the used automobiles returned to the dealership were the same automobiles that
the rental company had purchased. Second, the provisions were not anticompetitive because
the rental company's assumed monopoly in the current model used car market was an una-
voidable and reasonable outgrowth of the business practice of supplying rental customers
with new cars.
In Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Pa. 1973), one
count of a Sherman Act complaint was dismissed. The court held that a mortgagor's open-
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v. Carlisle Corp.66 is a useful case in illustrating a means, other
than section one of the Sherman Act, to prosecute reciprocity ac-
tivities.6 7 In Gore, the court held that a unilateral attempt to cre-
ate a reciprocal relationship could not be a violation of section one
of the Sherman Act. 8 However, the court found that the defen-
dant possessed the requisite specific intent to monopolize and that
there existed a dangerous probability of successful market domina-
tion. Thus, it held that the threatened reciprocity constituted an
attempt to monopolize in violation of section two of the Sherman
Act.6 9
Finally, the Federal Trade Commission revived its attack against
the practice of reciprocity pursuant to section five of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. In the earliest of the cases, the Commis-
sion accepted Assurances of Voluntary Compliance from a number
of major corporations which agreed to dismantle their respective
trade relations departments whose alleged function was to promote
reciprocal arrangements.70 However, the Commission announced in
1970 that it would no longer accept such assurances in reciprocal
dealing situations.7 1 In recent years, the Commision has limited its
efforts in the area of reciprocal dealings to securing several consent
decrees 72 and issuing a single advisory opinions.7  Because the po-
ing of interest-free accounts with lending institutions in return for the granting of home
mortgage loans did not constitute a reciprocal arrangement because the willingness to open
interest-free accounts was not a "product" which the plaintiffs "sold".
Finally, in Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971), the court
stated that non-coercive reciprocity was harmful and constituted a violation of §1 of the
Sherman Act. However, the court refused to award treble damages on the ground that the
party bringing the action was a party to the reciprocal arrangement. See notes 94-99 infra
and accompanying text.
66. 381 F. Supp. 680 (D. Del. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 529 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1976).
67. The case was an outgrowth of settlement discussions relating to a patent infringe-
ment suit. The plaintiff, Gore, held two patents on the manufacture of a certain type of
cable. It sued the defendant, Carlisle, for infringement. During the course of settlement
negotiations, Gore treatened that if the suit went to trial, it would discontinue purchasing
from the defendant's subsidiary a product unrelated to the disputed cable. The court held
that Gore's conduct constituted a form of reciprocity. 381 F. Supp. at 702.
68. Id. at 703.
69. Id. at 704.
70. See Chase Bag. Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 18,758
(1969); GAF Corp., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 18,694 (1969);
Union Camp Corp., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 18,669 (1969);
American Standard, Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 18,167
(1969).
71. See 478 ANTRmusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-3 (1970).
72. See Occidential Petroleum Corp., et al., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 20,520 (1974); Diamond Shamrock Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE
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tential for application of section five of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act to all types of reciprocity would appear to be substantial,
it seems incongruous that the Commission has not further pursued
the practice as a violation of the Act.
In summary then; the law prior to the Spartan Grain decision
suggests the following. First, section one of the Sherman Act is
probably applicable to both overt or coercive reciprocity and to ne-
gotiated or mutual patronage reciprocity." Second, section five of
the Federal Trade Commission Act is certainly applicable to the
former type of reciprocity. However, it remains unclear whether or
not it applies to the latter type as well. 5 Third, both sections are
probably not applicable to unilateral reciprocity although this pat-
tern of conduct may sometimes constitute attempted monopoliza-
tion in violation of section two of the Sherman Act.7 1 Finally, de-
pending upon who is a party to the action, the evidence disclosed,
and the standard of analysis employed, the practice of reciprocity
may or may not constitute a per se violation under the federal an-
titrust laws. 77 It thus becomes apparent that, given the relatively
scarce amount of adjudication and the manner by which most
cases were disposed of, neither a clear nor consistent set of signifi-
cant rules or guidelines can be said to have been established prior
to the Spartan Grain decision.
SPARTAN GRAIN & MILL Co. v. AYERS7 8
Factual Background
Spartan Grain & Mill Company was a feed merchant operating
mostly on a non-integrated basis. As such, its markets for feed
were slowly disappearing as other feed merchants increased their
REG. REP. (CCH) 20,520 (1974); The Southern Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 20,410 (1974); Georgia-Pacific Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 20,340 (1973).
73. See Giant Food, Inc. [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.(CCH) 21,416
(1978), where the Commission unanimously advised that Giant Food's development and sale
of market data to marketers of food products would not violate a prior FTC order. However,
the Commission further advised that any attempt by Giant Food to condition its patronage
of suppliers upon their purchase of the information service might well constitute an illegal
and anticompetitive trade practice.
74. See notes 48-54 supra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 42-44 and 70-73 supra and accompanying text.
76. See notes 66-69 supra and acompanying text.
77. See notes 58-60 and 65 supra and accompanying text.
78. 581 F.2d 4199 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979).
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control over producers and growers through integration. 7 The pro-
ducers involved in the case had raised egg-laying chickens both on
a contract basis and on an independent basis. However, under ei-
ther system, the producers would only buy chickens when someone
was committed to buying their eggs, thus guarding against the risk
that the eggs could not be marketed."s
In 1967 and 1968, the broiler industry in northeastern Georgia
fell into disarray. No guaranteed markets existed for the produ-
cers' eggs on either a contract or an independent basis. Thus, the
producers were threatened with abandoning their producing efforts
in the industry.8"
Spartan Grain seized upon the opportunity presented by the
business distress of the producers and introduced its own form of
contractual integration.8 It negotiated with broiler hatcheries in
Pennsylvania and Ohio for commitments to take eggs. It also ar-
ranged for primary breeders to produce flocks of laying chicks.
Spartan Grain then offered these flocks to the producers in north-
eastern Georgia, guaranteeing that it would buy the eggs and sell
them to the already committed hatchery markets in Pennsylvania
and Ohio. However, Spartan Grain had pursued this contractual
integration solely to maintain its own feed market. Thus, it offered
its program to the producers upon the condition that they
purchase only Spartan Grain's feed at a price substantially higher
than that of its competitors. 8 Four producers subsequently joined
in Spartan Grain's program.
After phasing out its contractual integration program, Spartan
Grain filed suit against three of the four producers for the unpaid
balances of their feed accounts.8 4 The three producers asserted an-
titrust counterclaims,8" which were severed by the district court for
79. 581 F.2d at 421.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 421, 422.
82. Id.
83. The court noted that the cost of the feed was a subject of controversy at trial. Spar-
tan Grain admitted that its price was higher but pointed out that it performed services that
some of the other feed companies did not. The producers urged that the difference was even
greater than that charged because Spartan's feed was inferior. Id. at 442 n.3
84. Id. at 422.
85. The producers asserted that Spartan Grain's dealings illegally tied the sale of feed to
both the sale of chicks and the purchase of eggs. These actions, they argued, were reciprocal
dealings prohibited by §1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1. They also urged that these were
tie-in arrangements which violated §1 of the Sherman Act and §3 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §14. Id. See note 104 infra for the Fifth Circuit's characterization of the transactions.
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later trial.81
After the contract portion of the case was adjudicated,87 the pro-
ducers' antitrust claims were tried. At the close of the producers'
evidence, Spartan Grain moved for a directed verdict.88 The trial
court denied the motion and ruled as a matter of law that, whether
viewed as reciprocal dealings or as traditional tie-ins, the transac-
tions were tying arrangements that constituted per se violations
under established antitrust analysis.89 The court then refused to
accept Spartan Grain's evidence dealing with the reasonableness of
its program and the alternatives open to the producers, thereby
leaving only the question of damages for trial. After the jury re-
turned verdicts for the producers,90 all parties appealed.
The Fifth Circuit Decision
The central issue on appeal before the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit was whether the trial court had correctly ruled that
Spartan Grain's activities were illegal business arrangements con-
stituting per se violations under the federal antitrust laws. This
question permitted the court to formulate certain rules and guide-
lines not adequately addressed by prior courts. Thus, the Fifth
Circuit was able to articulate an analytical framework which adds
both clarity and substance to the laws surrounding reciprocity.
The Private Remedy Under Section Four of the Clayton Act
The court's initial problem involved determining whether a
party to a reciprocal arrangement could maintain an action against
its trading partner" under section four of the Clayton Act.9' The
court noted s that previously the only reported private action
86. In that same month, the fourth producer with which Spartan Grain contracted filed
suit against Spartan Grain on similar antitrust grounds. His suit was consolidated with the
counterclaims of the other producers. 581 F.2d at 422.
87. See Spartan Grain and Mill Co. v. Ayers, 517 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1975).
88. 581 F.2d at 423.
89. The trial court invoked the standard articulated under Northern Pacific Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1957). See notes 56-59 supra and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the application of that standard by past courts to reciprocal dealings. See note 119
infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's application of that stan-
dard in Spartan Grain.
90. The jury verdicts for the four producers, before trebling, ranged from $7,000 to
$15,000. 581 F.2d at 423.
91. The producers and Spartan Grain were co-participants in the reciprocal dealing
arrangement.
92. See note 5 supra.
93. 581 F.2d at 424.
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brought by a party to the arrangement was Columbia Nitrogen
Corp. v. Royster Co.9 " The Columbia Nitrogen court had held as a
matter of law that a party to a non-coercive reciprocal agreement
could not maintain the antitrust action. 5 The Fifth Circuit refused
to adopt the Columbia Nitrogen rationale and allowed the produc-
ers to maintain their antitrust claims against Spartan Grain.9
Significantly, the Columbia Nitrogen rationale is directly predi-
cated on the doctrine of in pari dilecto 7 However, it is not clear
how the doctrine applies within an antitrust context if it applies at
all.98 Columbia Nitrogen should support the position that the de-
94. 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971). However, it should be noted that the court overlooked
several other reciprocity cases brought as a private action by a party to the arrangement.
See note 65 supra.
95. "[W]hen parties of substantially equal economic strength mutually participate in the
formulation and execution of the scheme and bear equal responsibility for the consequent
restraint of trade, each is barred from seeking treble damages from the other." 451 F.2d at
15-16, cited in Spartan Grain, 581 F.2d at 424.
96. The extent of the Fifth Circuit's comment on this issue is:
"We find no reason to adopt the view expressed in Columbia Nitrogren Corp. v.
Royster Co., 4 Cir. 1971, 451 F.2d 3, concerning the damages available in a private
reciprocity action. That decision assumed a violation of the Act was made out,
then held that there were no damages. Our decision rests on the earlier question,
whether there was a violation."
Id. at 425 n.7. It is possible that the court's reluctance to adopt the Columbia Nitrogen
position simply reflects the opinion that the Columbia Nitrogen rationale was inapplicable
to the Spartan Grain facts. In Columbia Nitrogen, the Fourth Circuit held that the district
court committed no error by declining to instruct the jury that the plaintiff could recover on
its counterclaim involving an alleged non-coercive reciprocal agreement. 451 F.2d at 13. In
the Spartan Grain case, on the other hand, the relationship between Spartan Grain and the
producers is clearly one suggestive of coercive reciprocity and an alleged wielding of eco-
nomic leverage on the part of Spartan Grain. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
This factual distinction between non-coercive and coercive reciprocity may explain the Fifth
Circuit's different approach concerning who can sue in a reciprocity case. This interpreta-
tion is undermined, however, by the court's reference to "cases brought by parties to the
agreement," 581 F.2d at 425, without distinguishing between mutual and coercive
reciprocity.
97. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) defines in pari dilecto as "[i]n equal fault;
equally culpable or criminal; in a case of equal fault or guilt."
98. In Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), the
Court considered a defendant's right to invoke the equitable defenses of in pari dilecto and
"unclean hands." Recognizing that a plantiff's conduct may be no less reprehensible than
that of a defendant, Mr. Justice Black, in speaking for the Court, nevertheless ruled that an
antitrust plaintiff was not to be barred from suit under the doctrine of in pari dilecto. Id. at
140. However, the Court refused to decide whether a plaintiff's involvement in monopolistic
activities could bar suit wholly apart from the doctrine. Id.
The proper scope within which the pronouncements of the majority opinion should be
viewed drew considerable comment from the other justices: Id. at 142 (White, J., concur-
ring); Id. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring in the result); Id. at 149 (Marshall, J., concurring in
the result); Id. 153-154 n.1 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). These
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fense of in pari dilecto still retains some vitality.9 9 The decision in
Spartan Grain, however, is consistent with other Fifth Circuit
cases which suggest that the defense may no longer be invoked in
an antitrust case.' 00 Although the Spartan Grain court never pre-
cisely addressed this question, 1 1 its result nonetheless represents a
position which would ensure a fair and adequate disposition of all
reciprocal arrangement cases regardless of who asserts the anti-
trust claim.0 2
The Tying Arrangement Analogy
The Fifth Circuit recognized that "reciprocal dealings have not
been the subject of extensive case law development. 10 3 Therefore,
the court was called upon to articulate the standard by which to
analyze the transactions between Spartan Grain and the produ-
cers. 104 The court found little assistance in the established legal
precedent addressing the practice of reciprocity.'0 5 The court did
individual comments have caused a great deal of difficulty for lower federal courts trying to
determine whether the defense of in pari dilecto applies in antitrust cases.
99. See also Dreibus v. Wilson, 529 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff's high degree of
involvement in an illegal act could constitute a defense to his claim). But cf. Javelin Corp. v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff will be barred from asserting his claim
only when the illegal conspriacy would not have been formed but for the plaintiff's
participation).
100. See Greene v. GeneralFoods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975) (court suggested,
in dicta, that it would not recognize the in pari dilecto defense in antitrust cases). Cf. Kes-
tenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975) (court held that plaintiffs
voluntary participation in an illegal act could reduce the amount of damages which might be
secured).
101. See note 96 supra.
102. See notes 134-136 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the application
of in pari dilecto within a reciprocity context.
103. 581 F.2d at 424.
104. The court noted that the transactions at issue in the case could be characterized as
either tie-ins or reciprocal dealings. A tie-in resulted when Spartan Grain arranged for the
producers to buy flocks as well as its feed. The reciprocal arrangement involved Spartan
Grain's buying eggs on the condition that the producers buy its feed. Id. at 424-425. Because
of the analytical reasoning adopted, the court did not consider the characterization of the
agreement as critical. See note 106 infra and accompanying text.
However, the court had to identify the nature of the arrangements to address the pro-
ducer's claims brought pursuant to §3 of the Clayton Act which bars only tying arrange-
ments. See note 10 supra. There, the court did recognize that Spartan Grain's purchase of
the eggs was crucial to its transactions with the producers. 581 F.2d at 428. Further, in
ruling that §3 of the Clayton Act was inapplicable to the transactions, id., the court neces-
sarily implied that the transactions were primarily reciprocal in nature.
105. The court examined three cases relating to the practice of reciprocity: F.T.C. v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) (see notes 48-51 supra and accompanying
text); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (see notes
52-60 supra and accompanying text); and Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d
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not, however, view this as particularly troublesome. It asserted
that reciprocal dealings and tying arrangements reflected similar
economic phenomena. 06 Thus, the court held that "the standard
for judging reciprocal agreements should be no higher than the
standard for judging tie-in arrangements. 1 0 7
The analogy adopted by the Fifth Circuit is one which most ap-
propriately recognizes the practice of reciprocity in its most basic
form, i.e., a seller using economic leverage in one market to gain an
unfair advantage in another. As such, the approach presumes that
the supplier is in some way coerced to make purchases from a par-
ticular seller. The language of the Spartan Grain decision itself
continually stresses the role that economic leverage plays in recip-
rocal relationships.10 8
However, there may be an inherent problem underlying the
Fifth Circuit's analogical reasoning because the court failed prop-
erly to differentiate between coercive and mutual reciprocity. 0 9 In
mutual reciprocity arrangements, both parties enjoy equal
purchasing power. The economic leverage presumptions found in
the case of coercive arrangements are not present. Consequently,
the extension of the tying arrangement analogy to all forms of reci-
procity may be improper.
Nonetheless, certain anticompetitive effects may result from a
3 (4th Cir. 1971) (see notes 94-99 supra and accompanying text). It found that these deci-
sions either did not have clear implications for non-merger cases or did not suggest an un-
ambiguous standard of application to all reciprocity arrangements. 581 F.2d at 424.
106. "In each case one side of a transaction has special power in the market place.
It uses this power to force those with whom it deals to make concessions in an-
other market. In tying arrangements, a seller with economic power forces the pur-
chaser to purchase something else to obtain the desired item. In reciprocal deal-
ings a buyer with economic power forces a seller to buy something from it to sell
its goods. In both cases the key is the extension of economic power in one market
to another market."
Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
The analogy of reciprocal dealings to tying arrangements is not a novel one. See Haus-
man, supra note 12, at 883; Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1313, 1387 (1965). See also note 55 supra and accompanying text. But
see Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 L. & CoNT.
PROB. 552 (1965), where the author rejects the analogy contending that tying arrangements,
which are dependent on horizontal market power, perpetuate monopoly income while recip-
rocal dealings, not dependent on any such power, do not typically lessen competition.
107. 581 F.2d at 425.
108. See note 106 supra.
109. The problem is especially significant because the analogy is the basis of the analyti-
cal framework under which the Fifth Circuit would scrutinize all reciprocal arrangements
which allegedly violate section one of the Sherman Act. See notes 137-138 infra and accom-
panying text.
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mutual reciprocity agreement. Competitors of the seller may still
be foreclosed from the relevant purchasing market despite the
merits of their respective products."' Extending the tying arrange-
ment analogy to mutual reciprocity transactions is not, then, im-
proper when one considers the protective purposes of the antitrust
laws."' Thus, although the tying arrangement analogy would fail
to account for the economic distinctions inherent in coercive and
mutal reciprocity, it would properly subject both types of reciproc-
ity to an adequate form of antitrust law scrutiny.
The Standard for Judging Reciprocal Arrangements
Having held that the standard for judging reciprocal agreements
should be no higher than the standard for judging tying arrange-
ments, the Fifth Circuit next discussed what that standard is and
how it should be applied to the Spartan Grain transactions. First,
the court recognized that not all tying arrangements are in fact
illegal. Rather, their per se illegality is to be determined by an
evaluation of the dual factors of "sufficient economic power" and a
"not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce" being af-
fected."' The court asserted that reciprocal dealings, then, are to
be reviewed under this same modified per se standard.
The Fifth Circuit found that a substantial amount of interstate
commerce was involved in the transactions between Spartan Grain
and the producers." 3 The court then focused on whether Spartan
Grain had sufficient economic power in the relevant market. The
court relied on standards enunciated in the Supreme Court deci-
sion of United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
110. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
111. See United States v. General Dynamics, 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966):
"If antitrust legislation was designed primarily to insulate customers from abuse,
the 'tying-in' analogy would be without merit with reference to non-coercive reci-
procity. However, this is not the case. The legislation is intended to preserve free
competition. Reciprocity, whether mutual or coercive, serves to exclude competi-
tors by the exercise of large scale purchasing power. This court concludes that the
analogy of reciprocity to 'tying-in' arrangements applies to both forms of
reciprocity."
Id. at 66.
112. 581 F.2d at 423.
113. The court never specifically addressed what would constitute a "not insubstantial"
amount of interstate commerce but simply stated, with reference to the Spartan Grain
transactions, that "[tihere is no doubt here that a substantial amount of interstate com-
merce is involved .... " 581 F.2d at 425. This result, although the product of a cursory
review, would nonetheless be consistent with the United States Supreme Court decision in
Fortner I. See note 60 supra.
[Vol. 11
1980] Reciprocal Dealings
(Fortner II).I" In Fortner II,. the Court held that such power could
only be attributed to a defendant upon a showing that it had some
market advantage over its competitors.115
However, the trial court in Spartan Grain had focused on the
relative power of Spartan Grain and the producers."6 There was
no discussion of its power relative to competitors. Therefore, the
requirements for a per se violation under Fortner II were not
shown.1 The Fifth Circuit held it necessary to reverse and re-
mand the case for a determination of whether Spartan Grain had
sufficient economic power. 1
This portion of the Spartan Grain decision presents two signifi-
cant analytical developments in the area of reciprocal dealings.
First, the Fifth Circuit predicated its entire analytical framework
on the dual requirement test of "sufficient economic power" and a
"not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce" being af-
fected.119 Thus, by adhering strictly to the framework, the court
appropriately refrained from articulating a standard which could
immediately subject all reciprocal dealings to per se illegality.1 0
114. 429 U.S. 610 (1977). The case involved the sale of prefabricated homes by United
States Steel with one of its subsidiaries offering 100 percent financing at a particularly low
interest rate to the purchaser. The financing was available only on homes offered by U.S.
Steel. The prices of those homes were significantly higher than those of U.S. 'Steel's compet-
itors. Fortner Enterprises, a multi-home purchaser, brought an action against U.S. Steel
alleging that the finance terms had been tied to the sale of the homes in violation of §1 of
the Sherman Act.
115. Id. at 617-619, discussed in Spartan Grain, 581 F.2d at 426.
116. The trial court's determination was based on Spartan Grain's ability to deal with
hatcheries in other states and on the producers having no reason for entering into a require-
ments contract with Spartan Grain but for their need for egg markets and flocks. The Fifth
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in Fortner II found neither of these factors, the exis-
tence of tying arrangements or the uniqueness of the offered package, to be suggestive of
economic power in the relevant market. Id. at 427.
117. The Fifth Circuit stated:
"The producers must show that Spartan had some economic advantage which ena-
bled it to offer this arrangement when its rivals could not. . . . The economic
power Fortner II requires . . . must come from Spartan's relationship with its
competition. If it had effective competitors in this field, economic power would not
have been shown, even though all the companies be more sophisticated and pow-
erful than the producers."
Id. at 427, 428.
118. Id. at 429.
119. The court twice articulated the standard introduced in Northern Pacific Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (see note 56 supra). 581 F.2d at 423 and 425.
120. The Fifth Circuit standard should be compared with the General Dynamics holding
where that court seemingly took no account of the sufficient economic power factor. See
note 59 supra. In light of the low amount of sales considered not insubstantial in Fortner I
(see note 60 supra), any standard for judging reciprocal agreements comparable to that im-
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Second, the Fifth Circuit held that, in order for the "sufficient
economic power" requirement to be met, it must be shown that the
defendant had some economic advantage not shared by its compet-
itors in the purchasing market. This standard imposes certain
unique considerations when applied to all forms of reciprocity.
Conceptually, the predatory nature of reciprocity rests in the de-
feat of quality and price as allocative guides in the market, the
creation of oligopolistic and monopolistic industries, and the accel-
eration of market foreclosure. 121 Within the context of coercive rec-
iprocity, these market effects result from the exercise of economic
leverage to exact reciprocating purchases from a disadvantaged
seller.1 2  The Fifth Circuit's test would require only a clear showing
that the defendant possessed that economic leverage in the
purchasing market. Thus, the court's standard of sufficient eco-
nomic power works well with respect to coercive reciprocity.
Mutual reciprocity arrangements, however, may present a some-
what difficult problem under the Fifth Circuit directives because
this practice does not reflect a wielding of economic leverage by
either of the parties to the arrangement. 2 3 Yet, even under the
Fifth Circuit test, mutual reciprocity arrangements could still be
judged per se illegal in those not atypical situations where one firm
possesses a unique market position in relation to its competing
sellers by reason of its ability to deal with a particular supplier on
both a purchase and sales basis.1 4
Thus, the sufficient economic power factor of the Fifth Circuit's
test is a valuable consideration in evaluating reciprocal arrange-
ments. Indeed, by comparing a seller's market status with that of
its other buying competitors, the factor necessarily prevents a
court from arbitrarily finding that a defendant possessed the kind
of economic power sufficient to warrant that the reciprocal dealings
involved constituted violations of section one of the Sherman Act.
Thus, the analysis propounded by the Fifth Circuit may tolerate
pliedly used by the General Dynamics court would render nearly every reciprocal agreement
a per se violation of §1 of the Sherman Act.
121. See notes 27-34 supra and accompanying text.
122. See notes 39 and 40 supra and accompanying text.
123. See notes 37 and 38 supra and accompanying text.
124. This situation would be represented by the classic instance of the conglomerate
involved in the sale of a product within a market composed of primarily single-unit firms.
The attractiveness of the demand input presented by all of its divisions to a particular sup-
plier might encourage the initiation of mutual reciprocity arrangements. See notes 25 and 26
supra and accompanying text.
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those reciprocal agreements that have insignificant anticompetitive
effects, but not tolerate those transactions clearly operating against
the protective purposes of the federal antitrust laws.
Unfortunately, one problem may arise from the approach taken
by the Fifth Circuit. The Spartan Grain court may have too
strictly applied the tying analogy to determine whether the defen-
dant had sufficient economic power. The court reversed the deci-
sion of the lower court on the basis that no evidence was intro-
duced at trial demonstrating that Spartan Grain had any cost
advantage over its rivals. 2 5 Yet it never precisely defined who
those "rivals" were. Assuming that the court intended to imple-
ment a mode of analysis which would guard against anticompeti-
tive effects, those "rivals" necessarily would have been the compet-
itors engaged in the egg purchasing market. 2 6 Following the
analogy through, the buying power of Spartain Grain, if greater
than that of its buying "rivals", would have been the factor that
allegedly induced the producers to participate in the reciprocal
arrangements."'
However, the court implicitly spoke of the rivals of Spartan
Grain as other feed retailers, competitors of those in the selling,
not the purchasing, market affected by the reciprocal arrange-
ments. l 8 The Fifth Circuit's incorrect characterization of Spartan
Grain's rivals most probably reflects the difficulty that the court
had in understanding a unique industry in the process of acceler-
ated integration.' 29 That analysis, however, should not undermine
the significance of the analytical framework articulated by the
court.
The Rule of Reason Test
In addition to the modified per se rule articulated, the Fifth Cir-
cuit noted that reciprocal dealings could be subject to a rule of
125. See notes 116-118 supra and accompanying text.
126. Within the context of reciprocal dealings, the economic leverage which the antitrust
laws are designed to guard against is rooted in a seller's quantitative and qualitative ability
to purchase. See note 24 supra.
127. On remand, then, the trial court should conceptually have been required by the
Fifth Circuit to consider whether Spartan Grain had any significant cost advantages over
other egg purchasers.
128. 581 F.2d at 427, 428.
129. See notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text. It is also possible that the court may
have substantively misconstrued the application of the sufficient economic power standard
and thus inappropriately defined the relevant market from which Spartan Grain's alleged
economic power flowed.
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reason analysis. 130 Prior to the Spartan Grain decision, any adjudi-
cation of an issue relating to reciprocity had centered narrowly on
the per se standard to be applied to the facts presented. 1 ' How-
ever, the Fifth Circuit now suggests that even if a defendant's reci-
procity activities are not illegal under the modified per se rule,
they may still violate the Sherman Act if the defendant entered
into the transactions with the intent of injuring competition or if
the transactions themselves had the effect of injuring competi-
tion."3 2 Of course, the plaintiff's burden of proof under such a rule
of reason analysis would be more stringent than that imposed
under a modified per se rule. However, by allowing a plaintiff the
opportunity to base a cause of action on either a modified per se
rule or rule of reason analysis where reciprocal activities are con-
cerned, the Fifth Circuit provides the broadest possible analytical
framework for redress of both coercive and mutual reciprocity
arrangements.
THE UNSETTLED QUESTIONS
The Spartan Grain decision represents an important judicial
pronouncement in the area of reciprocal dealings. However, several
questions of analysis remain unsettled.
First, it is not certain under what circumstances a party to a
reciprocal arrangement may maintain an antitrust action against a
co-participant to the transaction. The result may depend upon the
court's disposition toward the in pari dilecto defense in an anti-
trust context. 83 The in parti dilecto problem will necessarily arise
in cases involving mutual reciprocity where participation in an
agreement is voluntary and uninfluenced by the economic domina-
tion of one party over the other.'" The nature of this arrangement,
however, is not easily susceptible to governmental or private com-
130. 581 F.2d at 425, n.5.
131. See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics, 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) dis-
cussed at notes 52-60 supra and accompanying text.
132. See generally United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978);
United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) for a discussion of what considerations are involved in
a rule of reason analysis.
133. See notes 97-100 supra and accompanying text.
134. The entire issue of whether a party to a reciprocal arrangement can maintain an
antitrust action against the co-participant becomes moot where the arrangement is one in-
volving coercion. The alleged wielding of economic leverage by the defendant would necessa-
rily eliminate any in pari dilecto defense.
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petitor discovery. 15 Therefore, if the arrangement is to be subject
to antitrust law scrutiny, it must be because a party to the ar-
rangement brings it to the attention of a court. A court's refusal to
allow that party to maintain the action would only serve to shield
mutual reciprocity from antitrust scrutiny, thereby perpetuating
the practice.
If the Spartan Grain decision is viewed as sanctioning private
actions to redress illegal reciprocity practice, the application of the
appropriate antitrust laws to all illegal reciprocal arrangements
would be guaranteed. Thus, both coercive and mutual reciprocity
as anticompetitive business practices " would be subject to poten-
tial governmental and private policing efforts. The warning to the
business community that all forms of reciprocity are illegal would
thus be complete.
A second closely related problem presented by the Fifth Circuit's
decision is whether the court intended to extend its analytical
framework to both coercive and mutual reciprocity arrange-
ments. " ' It is possible that the failure of the court to precisely dif-
ferentiate between the two forms of reciprocity can be attributed
to its failure to recognize the different nature of the two practices.
This position erroneously assumes that all reciprocity actions
brought by parties to the arrangement necessarily involve an ele-
ment of coercion. However, a more feasible interpretation of the
decision, consistent with prior case law, 38 is that the court in-
tended its standard of analysis to extend to all reciprocity agree-
ments, both coercive and consensual in nature, in cases brought by
parties to the transaction.
A final question engendered by Spartan Grain is whether the
test propounded will apply if the government brings suit. The
Fifth Circuit was hesitant to extend its standard for judging recip-
rocal agreements beyond those instances where the action is
brought by a private party.'8 Although a distinction can be drawn
135. See HANDLER, supra note 38.
136. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
137. It should be recalled that the Fifth Circuit referred to "cases brought by parties to
the agreement," 581 F.2d at 425, without distinguishing between mutual and coercive
reciprocity.
138. See Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 15 (4th Cir. 1971); United
States v. General Dynamics, 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
139. The court stated:
"We intimate no view as to the proper standard in a suit brought by the govern-
ment against reciprocal dealings. The government's concern in such cases is with
the preclusion of other dealers from the market, not with the effects of the agree-
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between the microeconomic and macroeconomic anticompetitive
market effects of reciprocal dealings, 40 it is difficult to see the rele-
vance of this distinction with respect to antitrust values and the
promotion of a freely competitive market environment. Further,
this distinction necessarily implies that different analytical stan-
dards would have to be used to address the practice of reciprocity
depending simply on whether suit was brought by the Department
of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, a competitor of a party
to the reciprocal arrangement, or one of the parties itself. These
disjointed approaches would only serve to hinder effective anti-
trust scrutiny of reciprocal dealings. Moreover, no such distinction
is found in the tying arrangement cases from which the court
adopted its analytical framework. Thus, the Fifth Circuit's mode of
analysis should be extended to all reciprocity actions regardless of
who brings the action. Given the sufficiency of Spartan Grain for
judging the arrangements,141 the modified per se rule set forth by
the court should be readily adopted to evaluate all reciprocal prac-
tices regardless of the manner and procedural routes by which the
arrangement might be prosecuted.
CONCLUSION
Historically, reciprocal dealings have not been the subject of
much litigation. This has generated two problems. First, although
the business community has become increasingly aware that the
practice of reciprocity carries with it potential criminal and civil
liability under the federal antitrust laws,142 the absence of litiga-
tion may perpetuate the practice. Second, even if suit is brought
against a firm engaging in the practice, the dearth of legal prece-
dent and analysis may result in an improper evaluation of the ar-
rangement. The Spartan Grain decision, by sanctioning private
suits and providing the needed analytical framework where reci-
procity is involved, may provide the answer to both problems.
It would be premature to suggest that final judicial comment has
been made in connection with reciprocal dealings. The Department
of Justice must further pursue its attacks against reciprocity under
ment on the parties to it. Different considerations may govern."
581 F.2d at 425 n.5.
140. Compare notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text with notes 30-34 supra and
accompanying text.
141. See notes 122-124 supra and accompanying text.
142. See Reciprocity Violates the Antitrust Laws, PURCHASING 18 (June 28, 1978); Reci-
procity: Gone But Not Forgotten, J. MARKETING 54 (January, 1978).
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sections one and two of the Sherman Act. The Federal Trade Com-
mission must more fully exercise its broad powers against the prac-
tice pursuant to section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Most importantly, the pursuit of private remedies under section
four of the Clayton Act must become more prominent in matters
concerning reciprocity. Although ninety percent of all antitrust
cases are brought by the private sector of the bar,148 its role in the
area of reciprocity has been grossly obscure. However, the Spartan
Grain case demonstrates the potential effect such litigation can
have. Perhaps the potential for ensuring that reciprocal dealings
are properly prosecuted as violations of the federal antitrust laws
does rest in that private sector.
FRANK PAWLAK
143. 1972 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, 1973.
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